Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance

CCCLXXIX

François Cornilliat

Etudes Rabelaisiennes.
T. XLII

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ON SOUND EFFECTS IN RABELAIS
(PART II)
by François CORNILLIAT

V. – PARONYMIC WARS

Doulx sons n’en puis mettre en chantz, mais trenchans

Guillaume Cretin

After reviewing Rabelais’s ambivalent use of « rhyme effects », it is time to take a more direct look at our author’s art of punning. The subject is not exactly uncharted territory ; for the purpose of this study, I will focus on a few instances in which the pun’s power (depending on the encounter of terms exhibiting a similar « sound » but a different meaning) is exploited

in præsentia

, both antithetically and dialogically. I hasten to add that the separation of pun and « rhyme » in this case is a matter of convenience, since the

rime équivoque

, for one, can fuse them, and since « Gorgianic » figures are typically combined for maximum effect. Thus we have already touched on many paronomastic examples, and we are about to review new cases of

similiter desinens .

The difference is mostly one of focus, from sentence-structuring patterns to word-level paronymy – though the latter, as we will see, can both nurture and rupture the amplification mechanisms that we have been studying so far.

We have already seen that, for Rabelais, the clearest, most emphatic paronomastic opposition can be just as misleading as the verbal

équivoque

it was often supposed to expose and dispel in the practice of a

rhétoriqueur

such as Jean Molinet. In order to better understand this contrast, it is worth spending another moment with the « Indiciaire de Bourgogne ». Molinet could use the device to praise Charles the Bold, who (having learned from historians that kingdoms can be destroyed by carnal excess)

n’estoit trop mondain ne trop solitaire, mais humain et tout salutaire, non enclin à dormition, mais à soin et devotion, non à vaine mondanité, mais à saine mondicité, non à lubre concupiscence, mais à salubre continence, non à nocive ebrieté mais à nette sobrieté […]

… but also to warn him and remind him of his father’s more peaceful policies. Even though Philippe was famous for his « lubre concupiscence », this particular vice is now lined up with virtues that turn out to be more important for the state’s welfare :

Ton pere […] estoit le serviteur de Venus, tu es le disciple de Mars. Il estoit le mignon des dames, tu es le gorgias des armes. Il amoit fort le Saint Empire dont oncques ne fut empireur, ne le tourne pas en empire en guerroyant son empereur. […] Il acqueroit amis par humblesse, tu multiplyes ennemis par haultesse. Il s’est acquis non vertueux par bonté pacificque, garde toy que tu n’aquières non vicieux par durté terrificque.

There is no reason to suppose that Molinet was unaware of the discrepancy between his praise of the Duke’s chastity and the subsequent attack on his bellicism, which in retrospect makes his father’s dissipation look good. The

rhétoriqueur

would blame such ambiguities on the human condition ; even though the Machiavellian notion that some vices are in fact allowed in a prince cannot be very far behind, Molinet is not interested in this kind of cold-blooded analytical reduction but in the rhetorical amplification of each ethical contrast.

There is in fact a great deal of flexibility to such emphatic binary formulas ; and they do not necessarily hinder the « Aristotelian » positioning of virtue between two vices rather than in opposition to one. Aristotle himself states that extremes oppose not just each other, but also the middle (and vice versa), even though the former opposition is stronger than the latter (because there is more distance between the terms). The philosopher adds that one extreme may in fact be (or appear to be) closer to the middle than the other (e. g. temerity is closer to courage than cowardice is), which explains why we will commonly contrast one extreme to the relevant middle, thereby appearing to reduce a ternary structure to a binary one. This renders it more persuasive, from a practical viewpoint : more apt to make one choose (or to praise one for choosing) what is « good » over what is « evil ». Not only does it remains true that vice and virtue are contraries, but it is a fact that the more we are attracted to a particular « extreme », the further we are from choosing the corresponding « middle ». In our actual experience, whatever vicious extreme we desire most is also the most « contrary » to reason, even though this may not be the case from a formal point of view. And this – how we feel, the relative strength of our attraction or resistance – is rhetoric’s turf.

Thus we learn that Charles « n’estoit trop mondain ne trop solitaire »  Molinet posits this

juste milieu

at the beginning of a series of paronymic couples that may appear to erase it, as they go on to oppose lubricity to abstinence instead of inscribing a virtue between two vices, as the first « member » did. But Molinet knows where the strongest temptation lies 

a priori

, there is a greater risk that a Duke be « trop mondain » than « trop solitaire ». Our second quote, for its part, begins with an opposition that is openly contingent (the contrast of the two Dukes’dominant tastes) and may be colored in different ways. Through a succession of steps that paronomasia helps to « serialize » and harmonize, we reach a point where the opposition becomes that of virtue and vice as emblematized in the « nom » ; that is, in praise or blame. Paronomasia progressively « realizes » the contraries, it incarnates them – creating more and more ethical contrast where there was, originally, an accidental (and debatable) difference. The subtler lesson on temerity – Charles’specific excess – is not erased, but the orator has to create a legible ethical polarity out of the jumble of human conduct, acknowledging that it is partly a rhetorical effect ; yet a legitimate one, since the good and evil of the prince’s personal choices entail what is good and bad for his subjects, who will determine his « nom ». The binary beat of « demonstrative » rhetoric is unleashed against the greater risk, in this case the fact that Charles has lost all sense of his proper « middle » – making of what can still be seen as valor the opposite of every

other

good, moral and political. Thus doing, Molinet’s rhetoric does not erase all sense of irony or paradox from the human landscape ; nor does it preclude a position of active moderation among various excesses, which can also be deduced from inevitable inconsistencies between the binary couples used by the

rhétoriqueur

.

Now Rabelais’s ultimate view, on the contrary, seems to be that such emphatic formulations help usher in the reign of unmitigated Evil – by reifying the terms of the debate, thus giving them a monstrous life of their own, and making one

forget

the moderate middle. It is of course the

Quart Livre

that gives this final lesson, which I will only summarize

.

To make a couple of islands out of Enig and Evig, for example, is to use paronomasia in order to expose a famous German

équivoque

, which (used

in absentia

) allowed the Emperor to emprison the « Langrauff d’Esse ». Charles V pledged « ohne ewige Gefangnis », without perpetual emprisonment, instead of « ohne einige Gefangnis », without any emprisonment. Interestingly, the

Briefve declaration

’s mistaken translation seems to be driven by the desire to maximize the contrasting effect between opposite meanings and similar sounds, whereas in the original anecdote the pun masked the existence of an

intermediate

position between perpetual prison and no prison at all. The Landgrave was as much a victim of his own binary thinking as of his enemy’s wordplay Thus the logic of this pun directly contradicts Molinet’s hope of preventing equivocation by underlining contraries. But what matters here is its deployment

in præsentia

in a fictional context where twin islands function, at best, as emblems of meaninglessness, at worst as made-up sites for barbarous and deluding wars. This set-up ruins the notion that paronomastic antithesis can help reshape ethical oppositions in the very locus where

équivoque

looms. There is no discernible difference between Nargues and Zargues ; both Teleniabin and Geneliabin are « fructueuses en matiere de clysteres ». We learn that « Papefigues », in spite of their present pitiful condition, are not any better, as far as their faith and religious practices are concerned, than « Papimanes ». You can build a carnal cult on wind, in Ruach, just as well as on mustard, in Farouche. And around Gaster, it would be idle to decide who is more criminal, « Engastrimythes » or « Gastrolâtres ».

Thus verbal symmetries can be as dangerous as the ambiguities they could serve to set straight ; all the more so when they are given the dignity of proper names. They are, in fact, just as equivocal : not because they suggest phony resemblance, but because they create phony opposition. The difference between Quaresmeprenant and the Andouilles may not appear as empty as that between Nargues and Zargues – but in the final analysis, it is : their endless conflict hides the fact that these arch-enemies are propelled by similar idolizing passions. The idle duplication of sounds in the few names that Rabelais just throws at us for fun ends up signaling the deeper truth that informs the distracting tumult of more detailed episodes : the coincidence of « extremes » whose extravagant opposition monopolizes the ethical landscape, while the virtuous « middle » – neither Caresme nor Carnaval – is in great danger of disappearing. Behind the theater of contrary arguments and contrasted descriptions lurks a

degré zéro

, the basic rumble – « torche, lorgne », « brededin, brededac », « goth, magoth » – heard among the « parolles gelées », all that is left of the « grosse et felonne bataille » between the Arismapiens and the Nephelibates.

Molinet was creating contrast out of noise, loading the shift of just one syllable (« mundanité » vs. « mundicité ») with the weight of ethical choices ; Rabelais suggests that antagonism

is

noise, that war transforms you – frozen in time by hatred – into your opponent’s twin : whatever difference you are obsessing over ultimately means no more than that separating « brededin » from « brededac » – the clash of affronted bodies rendered by a mere onomatopoeia’s simulated declension. The « real » contrariety of good vs. evil, of « Physie » vs. « Antiphysie », is being superseded by the latter’s monstrous productions, staging their own vacuous conflict at the expense of all « measured » souls : as we learn at the end of chapter XXXII, in a furious list that still plays on sound echoes but dissolves even the appearance of meaningful contrast, there is no difference left between « Cagotz », « Calvins », « Caphars », and « Canibales », between « Papelars », « Pistoletz », « imposteurs de Geneve », and « enraigez Putherbes » – all sects engaged in a merciless but illusive struggle against one another, while trying to prove, in the manner of their mother anti-Nature, that night is day, war is peace, and ugliness is perfection.

So the paronomastic mold no longer indicates the possiblity of a dialectical arbitration between equivalence and opposition ; it spells trouble for the whole dialectical complex of equivalence and opposition, as the prologue hinted with its allusion to the Ramus/Galland controversy. What we should focus on is neither kind of logical equation, but « médiocrité » considered in itself, in its intrinsic virtue as a sincere disposition of the soul – rather than as a strategic position between symmetrical temptations (and their reciprocal ulceration), let alone as a « contrary » at war with its opposite. In fact, as E. Duval has shown, Aristotelian

mediocritas

itself soon proves insufficient, whether or not we understand it as a « mean » ; what is being promoted instead is the autonomy of Christian love, indefinitely refusing to choose between artificial contraries, and treating all extremes with the same quiet indulgence. Whether such a position can be held at all (by any one else than Pantagruel) is not clear, however. For one Couillatris, how many headless imitators ? And how simple does the world of Couillatris appear, compared to the ravaged universe in which Pantagruel is forced to live and travel. But

pantagruélisme

seems to believe in its own ability to avoid being crushed between a rock and a hard place, « entre l’enclume et les marteaulx ». Is it indeed possible to avoid being not just attacked, but (more subtly)

defined

by contraries while navigating among them ?

VI. – PARONYMIC GAMES

One reason, therefore, why antithetical couples can no longer sound as « serious », as high-minded, as they did in Molinet’s prose, is that by proposing false choices they directly undermine the

juste milieu

instead of indirectly supporting it. While they appear to become too « hard », entrenching conflicts that are the product of reciprocal appetites, they are, in fact, without substance, sheer « sound effects » lending themselves to irony and satire, at the hands of their rhetorical manipulator. Signaling or illustrating the empty logic of all-out war, however, is not their only function in Rabelais. There are moments when the music of contrast seems played out for fun, in a fashion that can feel cheerful rather than bitter. Such appears to be the case of those exaggerated dialogical lists in which all « Gorgianic » effects are being mobilized at once. If the names of the islands in the

Quart Livre

represent moral antithesis at its most vacuous and dangerous, could it be that the torrential « blasons » of the

Tiers Livre

, on the contrary, expose such nonsense for what it is, dissolving it in irrepressible – but good-natured – laughter ?

Voire .

In the symmetrical « blasons des couillons », we deal with adjectives, not substantives (let alone proper names) : accidents or qualities, not reified substances. The only substance would be the « couillon » itself – full or empty, vigorous or decaying –, if it were not considered (by synecdoche) the representative of its owner, thus elevated by way of an ironic but casual compliment. Sounds then are given a (seemingly) free ride : each utterance, instead of forming a singular nomination, is a mere touch of color in the wholly redundant appraisal of what is being talked about. Within each list, clusters are produced by

homoioteleuton

(« poudrebif – brandif – positif – gerondif – genitif – actif », or « hallebrené – lanterné – prosterné – embrené »), of which paronomasia is but a particular application (« massif – lascif », « paillard – pillard », or « pesneux – vesneux », « farineux – farcineux »).

Annominatio

, in this case, produces terms that are pleonastic instead of antithetical ; what is more, if we comb the two distant lists in order to extract and confront words that would make an acceptable paronymic contrast (e. g. « positif » vs. « putatif »), we find that Rabelais seems to have limited such possibilities, by exploiting different families of suffixes and alliterations. As a result, the contrast is globally felt, more than verified term by term ; sound effects are meant to reinforce semantic assimilation

within

each of the two lists. This is

inculcatio

in its simplest form : presumption of synonymy, atomization of syntax, and a massive split between blame and praise, which does not need to be declined through individual contrastive pairings ; the point being to qualify objects that are supposed to fall on one side of the ethical divide, instead of facing or straddling it.

The problem here, of course, is that blame and praise are not devoted literally to the Devil or the Virgin Mary, but figuratively to the interlocutors’genitals. Moreover, the dialogical, conversational, circumstantial situation also forces us to question the typical split of epideictic discourse. For one thing, praise and blame do not constitute the final word here, the sole end of the message, but a mere – if grotesquely expanded –

captatio,

a preliminary to Panurge’s initial, sincere, and laconic (but illegitimate) question : « Me doibs je marier ou non ? » ; and to Frère Jean’s final, sarcastic, and self-amplifying (but legitimate) answer, which of course throws the question back to Panurge.

This is

inculcatio

indeed, but made funny, if not made fun of : invested by the Erasmian critique of

battologia,

and thus reworked into a supreme example of the

uber / tuber

topos analyzed by Terence Cave. We can say that « Isidorian » accumulation now harbors doubts about its own fertility ; not because it meets our modern metaphysics of absence, but because it is forcibly

contextualized,

seized in the perspective of Erasmian rhetoric, submitted to questions regarding

decorum

and

kairos :

who speaks ? to whom ? what for ? to what effect ? The self-validating rhetoric of praise and blame, only concerned with

what

one « s’est proposé blasonner », is suddenly being attributed to appetites and agendas, to instances and circumstances, by an intention that is at least (possessing its own circumstances, agenda, and appetite) one step removed from the stage : Medieval

inculcatio

meets Renaissance

declamatio

, with the consequence that the speeches – especially, as Mireille Huchon has shown, their exaggerated poetic features – cannot be read at face value. Panurge is flattering Frère Jean, fishing for the right answer ; Frère Jean is sending Panurge back to his obsession, more precisely to what he – at his earthly level – sees as the physical root of his friend’s moral disease.

But for all their obvious symmetry, the lists are not « 

du tac au tac » :

Frère Jean’s answer is by no means automatic ; the « contreblason » is not his first reply, which (« en alaigresse d’esprit ») was an apparently unambiguous « marie toy », and made Panurge apparently happy by clearing up his doubts and fears. Yet the monk added a sophistic warning against any pause in the use of the « mentule », which was enough to launch another round of extreme Panurgian boasting : the organ in question has no choice but to be « sans aulcun default », as the

rhétoriqueurs

used to say of the Virgin. It is this fatuous burst of self-praise that triggers the reciprocation of the « blason », this time functioning as a reality check : the same Frère Jean who advocated permanent genital action (in keeping with Panurge’s hyperbolic compliments) now points out the obvious aging of his friend’s body, and makes verbal

copia

celebrate physical sterility. Thus it is not enough to note that the lists are antithetical, nor indeed that they are dialogical : the point is that the dialogue problematizes (instead of merely implementing) the opposition, by making us feel the (self-induced) excess inherent in the practice of praise itself, and the (self-denying) default lurking in such excess – again, not just in language

per se

, but in its interlocked practitioners.

The lists, therefore, are not textuality cut loose, language escaping from context, be it to mock the traditional amplifying power of righteous blame and praise. Rather, they represent language

meeting

a context that messes up the pure

copia

it used to enjoy as

inculcatio,

born of what John of Salisbury, Gerson and others called « 

abundantia cordis

 », to the greater glory (or shame) of unambiguous objects. Panurge’s problem concerns another type of abundance

 ;

it is also the problem of generic, objective discursive tools being enlisted by subjective, individual anxiety. The list is longer, and seems more gratuitous than its Medieval models, because it is in fact less so, driven not by universal evidence, but by personal denial – both urgent and ineffective. Amplification here is a direct function of

philautia

 : of the fact that self-love can never be satisfied. And the satire of

philautia

, in order to break or at least expose it, has to respond in kind, exhibiting the « flip side » in equally excessive terms. The list is longer because it is either self-deafening (in Panurge’s case) or pretending to get through (in the case of Frère Jean). Both cases imply another intention at work, an ironic (rather than enthusiastic) conscience behind the voices that are being confronted, showing how misleading – how farcical – their apparent symmetry can be : actual human exchanges are multi-dimensional, and the (inevitable ?) corruption of just one dimension (say, ethos) is sufficient to make the familiar divide of blame and praise both trivial and unreliable. Instead of confirming the transcendance of meaning, for example, emphatic verbal repetition only confirms the utterer’s inability to grasp it. Instead of providing efficient markers for stable moral alternatives, verbal contrast merely reflects the shifting strategies of self-centered agendas

.

It is no mistake if the same episode contains the clearest lesson ever administered by Rabelais on the matter of sound and signification : « l’oracle des cloches de Varenes », whose « son […] plus fatidicque que des chauldrons de Juppiter en Dodone » Panurge first hears as meaning « Marie toy, marie toy », then (having listened to Frère Jean on the « doubte de Coquage ») as meaning « Marie poinct, marie poinct ». The paronomastic structure of the two hearings (« toy » vs. « poinct », « [trou] veras, veras » vs. « [repen] tiras, tiras ») is enough to give

la puce à l’oreille

 : such oppositions are born of meaning-free sounds – not in the ear, but in the mind of the listener. Meaningless noise is made meaningful by a process that will soon, and just as well, load it with the opposite meaning. A

rhétoriqueur

such as Molinet did not hold (with a few exceptions) verbal sound to be « fatidicque », but felt he could count on it in a paradoxical way, both to make difference or opposition sensible through the very means – accidental verbal resemblance – that made them equivocal,

and

to saturate the celebration (or vituperation) of unequivocal objects by multiplying resemblance, thus making it appear less and less accidental. Such well-rehearsed protocols could easily be adapted to the present situation, even though the value of the object under consideration (marriage) is supposed to be a matter of private choice and « conseil » (as opposed to universal adoration or execration). For example, Frère Jean’s first answer to Panurge (« marie toy, et carillonne à doubles carillons de couillons »), anticipating on the sound of the bells that will soon come their way, and that sound itself, once interpreted « en bonne part », both use alliteration and

declinatio

in a manner reminiscent of

rhétoriqueur

style : music could be made verbal to express and nurture the good news of positive counsel and resolution – of human will and hope made as final, as unequivocal as humanly possible.

Instead, the whole process is being perverted by the hermeneutics of desire : sound (like everything else) is being « deciphered » by self-interest, as though it itself carried the responsibility of choice, instead of ampifying the choice that has been or can be made. As a result, its purported meaning becomes at once rigid and fickle : just as Panurge cannot help finding a signification that he deems « fatidicque », he cannot help changing it at the merest hint of an alternative – the bell sound, of course, remaining the same, only a bit stronger. The more he wants a dogmatic truth, with no connection to his own « conseil » (nor acceptance of uncertainty), the more he makes it – and the very contrast of true vs. false, good vs. evil – the petrified property of illegitimate fetishes (verbal or not), as well as the mere verbal echo of his uncontrollable mood swings. The next step would be to deify the bells and endow their peal with meanings not just antithetical, but eager to wage war against one another.

We end up with a mirror-image of what Molinet had in mind : for the « Indiciaire », the amplification of contingent ethical choices through the equivocal « sound » of language could make them clearer, stronger, and could even (ultimately) suggest, through appropriate interpretation, their connection to a higher order ; in the case of Panurge, the premature interpretive projection of a choice not made onto hollow sound endows the latter with clues that feel promising but prove unable to anchor ethical decisions. In the first instance, paronomastic contrast marks the progression of personal choice from structural equivocation ; in the second, the regression of structural choice to personal equivocation. For Molinet, « music » (the seduction of sound over meaning) can be a Siren song, possessing the lure of

équivoque

 ; but it can also suggest, once

équivoque

has been cleared and choices have been made (or at least proposed), the ultimate reward of well-managed language, the enjoyment of sound

beyond

meaning,

because

it is certain to remain – no matter how stretched and played with – happily « married » to meaning. For its part, the noise of the Varennes bells is no Siren song ; it contains nothing that is inherently deceptive. For the same reason, it could be associated with the post-decision landscape, and help celebrate a choice made « en alaigresse d’esprit », having it feel ever sounder (if I may) by further enchanting the celebrant’s ear. Not all impositions of meaning are illegitimate

.

But Panurge is his own Siren ; and because he projects his desire onto whatever he hears, he projects his fear also.

VII. – PARONYMIC PRAISE ?

To conclude on this point, let me now turn to the more immediately dialogical « blason » of Triboullet by Panurge and Pantagruel. In direct reference to the Erasmian model, folly, as embodied by Triboullet, becomes the object of admiration : contrary to the case of the « couillons », this time there appears to be mostly

encomium

. Even though many of Panurge’s epithets can be understood as demeaning, the partners act as if they were in agreement, and making each other happy : if there is a case where sound-driven contrast is neither earnest nor sarcastic, this would be it. Again « Gorgianisms » play a major role in the structuration of the epithets : there is an abundance of rhymes and echoes within each of the lists. In addition, rhyming across the lists is relatively frequent this time around (though by no means systematic), while one-on-one pairings between the two « columns » remain rare, even though the lists are now supposed to alternate and answer one another. Yet the overall effect is far from pure ; nor is it monological. The contrast may be softened, but it remains perceptible : with Pantagruel developing the heavenly (« celeste ») register, Panurge anwers in the earthly (« terrestre ») mode ; then Pantagruel takes on Kingdom or Empire (« Cæsarin »), and Panurge the Church (« Papal »), with obvious irony at the latter’s expense, thus implicitly presented as the earthlier of the two.

Then comes a rare full-fledged

annominatio

 : Pantagruel’s « total » vs. Panurge’s « cotal » (« so-and-so » in Italian, as well as « phallic »). Panurge continues to take advantage of possible adjacent meanings in the giant’s words (e. g. « peregrin ») to develop yet another paradigm (e. g. falconry) through which the praise tends to lose focus and sound parodical or ironic, often bordering on

vituperatio

(« radotant », « catharré », « susanné »…). Sometimes the effect is purely semantic ; sometimes it plays on the signifier as well : e. g. « abrevié » launching, after « abreviateur », yet another series of church-related terms, as Pantagruel sticks, for a while, to matters textual and rhetorical, before switching to anatomy – in the scientific register –, followed of course by Panurge – in the obscene register. One is reminded of the divergent interpretations of the « Enigme en prophetie » at the end of

Gargantua .

Whether we think the contrast genuine (as does M. A. Screech, who opposes Pantagruel’s understanding of folly’s divine character to Panurge’s inability to perceive it) or itself ironic (for E. Duval, on the contrary, Pantagruel’s praise of folly is, in this case, a mere appearance and yet another gentle trap designed to bring Panurge to his senses), it is clear that there is no real dialogue or exchange here : the two friends pursue a parallel course, even though the second feeds, in sophistic fashion, on the suggestions of the first – yet without quite transforming their purported unanimity into aggressive opposition. There is no real « harmony », let alone fusion ; but there is no war either.

The exact ethical value of such a blurred contrast is therefore hard to pin down. The famous episode of the « trophées », in

Pantagruel

, gave a different example of

contrepoint,

whereby Panurge parodied his master’s composition without attacking it. While a Molinet might have constructed one of his admonitions out of the two celebratory poems’rhymes (« vertus » vs. « Baccus », « champions » vs. « pions », « morpions » vs. « carpions », « Scipions » vs. « scorpions », and especially « gloire » vs. « boire »), their distribution underlined the global contrast without tying it up to a syntax of strict, explicit opposition. Perhaps these were contraries (« high » vs. « low », body and soul, etc.), but their narrativization gave them breathing space, making them ever more complex. The food-oriented parody was put together by the very « engin » (Panurge’s) that was being praised in the first « trophée » for having won with something else than brute strength : cleverness perhaps, but more fundamentally God’s pleasure. In this sense, the parody of a monument to arms and war that itself displaces the locus of « gloire » (from force to cunning, from cunning to grace) can be said to complete the job rather than contradict it : the great feats that are being celebrated find their deeper meaning in the upstaging of the bellicose rhetoric of glory, first by God’s will, then by some all-too-human salt (and vinegar). Similarly, the game of parallelisms played by the companions (« Il n’est umbre », etc.) played on well-rehearsed distinctions (war and love, for instance), but the playful mode suggested that these different values are in fact compatible, at least in the kind of Evangelical setting where no one is supposed to be too certain of one’s own merit, and everyone is supposed to enjoy a joke.

This latter game does seem to find an echo in the final exchanges between Pantagruel and Panurge over Triboullet (« Si raison », etc.), as befits the paradoxical functioning of the folly vs. wisdom axis. Again it is clear that the giant and his friend are not on the same level ; but is one not allowed to infer that this very difference of dignity, properly moderated by paradox, is what keeps them together as « Pantagruélistes », a company forming a kind of expanded « middle », capable of incorporating – if not taming – its extremes ? Contrary terms, we saw, can morph into reified dogmas or animated monsters : from words to things to their final, hideous incarnation, we follow the progress of the plague. Conversely, friends can take the stuff of fanaticized psychomachias, or actual human wars, and reshuffle it, posit it

on the same side

, for a moment of grace, while giving it the charm of wordplay : « champions » and « carpions », « gloire » and « boire »,

même combat

– God willing. Instead of watching words harden into things, we hear, for once, things relax into words.

In the « trophées », at least, I would suggest that paronyms, instead of entrenching latent moral conflict (s) between and within our various selves, help make (light) fun of them and, by virtue of their very « wordiness », allow entertainment in a brief moment of peace : the ballet of contrary words now suggests that « things » are in fact more complicated than our binary minds would have us believe, and parody strikes a subtle balance

between

satire and virtue, as a kind of knowing indulgence. Such cases, for me, represent the perfect stylistic « middle » between the two « Rabelais » described at the beginning of this study, one driven by genuine love of verbal accumulation, and the other acting it out with a sarcastic intent. Certain

forms

of play with words do not erase the potential for abuse and conflict, but make them the currency of pleasure among friends – including well-disposed readers.

One has to recognize, however, that the limits and merits of such « friendly » parody are much more difficult to figure out in the case of the

Tiers Livre

’s episode, insofar as the friends’complementarity, while still mediated by charitable love, has long been in very real danger of hardening into antithesis – what with Panurge getting upset and stubbornly offering interpretations « au rebours ». Still : when « heard » with the paronomastic mold in mind, the duet over Triboullet could suggest that it will not let itself be contained or « petrified » by it. The symmetry is both obvious and elusive, the agreement (be it to disagree) almost palpable, if very temporary. The « low » register, for example, is not just low : it is digressive in nature. It refuses to be the strict mirror-image of the « high », as

vituperatio

was (in principle) to

laudatio

. It amuses itself with excursions in the landscape of its own obsessive temptations. It is important to remember, however, that Panurge is in the process of being persuaded, and that he feels more and more strongly about it. Not just any fool, but the one and only Triboullet will give him, he thinks, « quelque belle resolution » : a confidence which at this point we can safely presume to be misguided. Panurge may be playing with his friend’s choice of words, and enjoying a moment of soft parody : while demeaning Triboullet (or, rather, his supposedly « celeste » folly) he, nevertheless, genuinely praises him as provider of his own final persuasion – to marry or not. This mistaken perspective makes the « lowly » accents of his

blason

less a willing parody of Pantagruel’s performance than a symptom of his own « terrestre » and self-centered impatience.

Now if the « high » register of the giant is itself loaded, as Duval believes ; if Pantagruel does not quite pretend to reach up to the « celeste » here ...